Many commenters believe the Tejas missed a significant market opportunity due to its delayed entry into service.
The Tejas would have been a perfect light fighter if it entered service around 2005.
It could have easily captured the market segment occupied by F/A-50, M-346, and older F-16s.
It would have been perfect for countries seeking to replace older Mirages and F-5s.
The Tejas would have been a perfect light fighter if it entered service in 2001.
The plane became outdated before its incorporation into the air force because of massive delays.
Iterative production, like the JF-17, could have matured Tejas into a better platform through phased orders.
The Tejas program has been severely hampered by various delays, changing requirements, and procurement issues.
HAL's inability to keep to schedule, integration issues, and constantly changing IAF requirements hindered the Tejas program.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) struggles to keep to a schedule.
The program faced engine and radar integration issues.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) constantly changed its requirements.
The Tejas program started in the 1970s, received meaningful funding in the 1990s, and had its first flight in 2001.
The Tejas was on paper in the 1980s.
First meaningful funding was given in the 1990s.
The first flight occurred in 2001, despite crippling sanctions post-1998 nuclear testing.
The long timeline from first flight to induction and issues with the Mk1A version represent a travesty.
Induction happened in 2016, 15 years after the first flight, with severe capability waivers.
The 'combat capable' Mk1A is still not delivered by March 2026.
Mk1A delivery is due to incomplete weapons and systems integration, not engine delays.
The Mk2 static full-scale prototype is not yet visible for an 'elephant walk' demonstration.
The article focuses solely on technical aspects, while the real problems with Tejas are non-technical, like delays.
The IAF should have ordered more aircraft to keep the F404 production line running.
This would have prevented engine delivery bottlenecks for Mk1A production or allowed an earlier switch to F414 engines.
The F404 production line shut down in 2016.
The Mk1A idea was mooted around 2015, got production funding approval in 2021, and the Mk1 IOC squadron was stood up in 2016.
The Tejas Mk1 FOC squadron was stood up in 2020.
IAF should have ordered 40 more Mk1s.
The F404 line shut down because only 38 Mk1s were produced.
India had orders for about 75 F404 engines, including prototypes and spares, before the Mk1A order.
Tejas is not the only GE F404 user, with legacy F-18 Hornet, F-117, and F-20 Tigershark also using it.
FA-50/T-50 had local license production in South Korea.
Mk1A was not funding approved, so HAL could not order more engines for it.
Mk1A had a quotation/proposal to license produce GE F404 in 2020, but it was cut for cost.
Indian defense procurement lacks agility and foresight for long-term funding decisions.
Late Manohar Parrikar is credited for reviving the Tejas and inducting it into service.
The Tejas possesses modern technical features but faces challenges in integration and overall perception.
The claim of Tejas being an 'incredible fighter' is questioned, calling it an Indian equivalent of the FC-1/JF-17.
It is viewed as a cheap light fighter affordable by less rich countries.
India being 'stuck' with Tejas 25 years after its first flight is seen as baffling and embarrassing.
China has advanced two generations ahead of the FC-1 in the same period.
The Tejas platform is quite good, with engine delivery delays being the main issue for orders.
The Indian Air Force has already ordered 180 more Tejas platforms.
The last GE engine was delivered in January, with no further deliveries from GE since.
A Tejas Mk1A with Uttam radar, SRK, Astra Mk-2ER, and BrahMos-NG could be an excellent combination.
This configuration would be better than the JF-17 Block 3.
Most proposed systems like Uttam, Astra Mk-2, and BrahMos-NG are not yet operational together on Tejas Mk1A.
Early Tejas Mk1A jets still use Israeli radar because Uttam was not ready.
Comparing Tejas's future configuration to the already fielded JF-17 Block 3 is unfair.
JF-17 Block 3 already fields AESA radar and PL-15 class BVR missile capability.
The Tejas and JF-17 Block 3 have different technical specifications for key systems.
| Feature | Tejas | JF-17 Block 3 |
|---|---|---|
| AESA Radar Cooling | Liquid cooled | Air cooled |
| Engine Type | GE-F404 (Western) | RD-93 (Russian, derived from RD-33) |
| Engine Life/Capacity | — | Known to have less operational life and electric generation capacity |
Astra Mk-2 is already in Limited Series Production (LSP).
Technically, Tejas has no major issues and is an extremely modern platform.
It features a quad-axis fly-by-wire system, liquid-cooled AESA radar, and a carbon composites body.
Tejas has a low Radar Cross-Section (RCS) even with a full weapon loadout.
While Tejas is modern on paper, modernity alone does not ensure success, as delays and costs are significant.
Tejas has higher operational and acquisition costs than JF-17 Block 3.
Tejas has a high availability rate of 75%.
All subsystems are properly integrated, and the air force will evaluate it in April for induction.
Tejas is significantly more expensive per aircraft than JF-17 Block 3.
| Aircraft | Cost per aircraft |
|---|---|
| Tejas | 40 million dollars |
| JF-17 Block 3 | 25 million dollars |
Tejas and JF-17 programs had fundamentally different goals and development strategies.
The Tejas and JF-17 programs had distinct objectives based on their respective nations' needs.
| Program | Primary Goal |
|---|---|
| Tejas | Multi-role jet replacing Mig-21s and acting as a training platform; maturing industrial capacity. |
| JF-17 | Low-cost, modern fighter, integrating Chinese avionics, due to India's Su-30MKI procurements. |
Developing many technologies from scratch for Tejas will benefit future Indian projects.
There are differing opinions on how fighter jet performance should be judged, especially without real combat experience.
Judging an aircraft's capabilities before active conflict performance is seen as premature.
It is possible to judge an aircraft's capabilities before discussing its combat performance.
Real combat can shatter an aircraft's abilities judged on paper, as demonstrated by other jets.
A Rafale was shot down by a J-10, despite expectations of Rafale dominance.
F-15s, considered unstoppable, have been shot down multiple times.
Only 3 F-15s were shot down by Kuwaiti air defenses in the current conflict.
The F-15 has not been defeated in aerial combat, with air defense shootdowns not counting negatively.
The Rafale shootdown was attributed to superior Pakistani AWACS usage and datalink efficiency.
One never knows how well a jet will perform unless it has faced real combat.
The F-22 is a fifth-generation air superiority fighter, while Tejas is more comparable to F-4 or F-5 for the IAF.
The F-22 is the best fighter jet for air superiority missions.
A humorous suggestion to order more 112 Rafales is made.
Many commenters believe the Tejas missed a significant market opportunity due to its delayed entry into service.
The Tejas would have been a perfect light fighter if it entered service around 2005.
It could have easily captured the market segment occupied by F/A-50, M-346, and older F-16s.
It would have been perfect for countries seeking to replace older Mirages and F-5s.
The Tejas would have been a perfect light fighter if it entered service in 2001.
The plane became outdated before its incorporation into the air force because of massive delays.
Iterative production, like the JF-17, could have matured Tejas into a better platform through phased orders.
The Tejas program has been severely hampered by various delays, changing requirements, and procurement issues.
HAL's inability to keep to schedule, integration issues, and constantly changing IAF requirements hindered the Tejas program.
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) struggles to keep to a schedule.
The program faced engine and radar integration issues.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) constantly changed its requirements.
The Tejas program started in the 1970s, received meaningful funding in the 1990s, and had its first flight in 2001.
The Tejas was on paper in the 1980s.
First meaningful funding was given in the 1990s.
The first flight occurred in 2001, despite crippling sanctions post-1998 nuclear testing.
The long timeline from first flight to induction and issues with the Mk1A version represent a travesty.
Induction happened in 2016, 15 years after the first flight, with severe capability waivers.
The 'combat capable' Mk1A is still not delivered by March 2026.
Mk1A delivery is due to incomplete weapons and systems integration, not engine delays.
The Mk2 static full-scale prototype is not yet visible for an 'elephant walk' demonstration.
The article focuses solely on technical aspects, while the real problems with Tejas are non-technical, like delays.
The IAF should have ordered more aircraft to keep the F404 production line running.
This would have prevented engine delivery bottlenecks for Mk1A production or allowed an earlier switch to F414 engines.
The F404 production line shut down in 2016.
The Mk1A idea was mooted around 2015, got production funding approval in 2021, and the Mk1 IOC squadron was stood up in 2016.
The Tejas Mk1 FOC squadron was stood up in 2020.
IAF should have ordered 40 more Mk1s.
The F404 line shut down because only 38 Mk1s were produced.
India had orders for about 75 F404 engines, including prototypes and spares, before the Mk1A order.
Tejas is not the only GE F404 user, with legacy F-18 Hornet, F-117, and F-20 Tigershark also using it.
FA-50/T-50 had local license production in South Korea.
Mk1A was not funding approved, so HAL could not order more engines for it.
Mk1A had a quotation/proposal to license produce GE F404 in 2020, but it was cut for cost.
Indian defense procurement lacks agility and foresight for long-term funding decisions.
Late Manohar Parrikar is credited for reviving the Tejas and inducting it into service.
The Tejas possesses modern technical features but faces challenges in integration and overall perception.
The claim of Tejas being an 'incredible fighter' is questioned, calling it an Indian equivalent of the FC-1/JF-17.
It is viewed as a cheap light fighter affordable by less rich countries.
India being 'stuck' with Tejas 25 years after its first flight is seen as baffling and embarrassing.
China has advanced two generations ahead of the FC-1 in the same period.
The Tejas platform is quite good, with engine delivery delays being the main issue for orders.
The Indian Air Force has already ordered 180 more Tejas platforms.
The last GE engine was delivered in January, with no further deliveries from GE since.
A Tejas Mk1A with Uttam radar, SRK, Astra Mk-2ER, and BrahMos-NG could be an excellent combination.
This configuration would be better than the JF-17 Block 3.
Most proposed systems like Uttam, Astra Mk-2, and BrahMos-NG are not yet operational together on Tejas Mk1A.
Early Tejas Mk1A jets still use Israeli radar because Uttam was not ready.
Comparing Tejas's future configuration to the already fielded JF-17 Block 3 is unfair.
JF-17 Block 3 already fields AESA radar and PL-15 class BVR missile capability.
The Tejas and JF-17 Block 3 have different technical specifications for key systems.
| Feature | Tejas | JF-17 Block 3 |
|---|---|---|
| AESA Radar Cooling | Liquid cooled | Air cooled |
| Engine Type | GE-F404 (Western) | RD-93 (Russian, derived from RD-33) |
| Engine Life/Capacity | — | Known to have less operational life and electric generation capacity |
Astra Mk-2 is already in Limited Series Production (LSP).
Technically, Tejas has no major issues and is an extremely modern platform.
It features a quad-axis fly-by-wire system, liquid-cooled AESA radar, and a carbon composites body.
Tejas has a low Radar Cross-Section (RCS) even with a full weapon loadout.
While Tejas is modern on paper, modernity alone does not ensure success, as delays and costs are significant.
Tejas has higher operational and acquisition costs than JF-17 Block 3.
Tejas has a high availability rate of 75%.
All subsystems are properly integrated, and the air force will evaluate it in April for induction.
Tejas is significantly more expensive per aircraft than JF-17 Block 3.
| Aircraft | Cost per aircraft |
|---|---|
| Tejas | 40 million dollars |
| JF-17 Block 3 | 25 million dollars |
Tejas and JF-17 programs had fundamentally different goals and development strategies.
The Tejas and JF-17 programs had distinct objectives based on their respective nations' needs.
| Program | Primary Goal |
|---|---|
| Tejas | Multi-role jet replacing Mig-21s and acting as a training platform; maturing industrial capacity. |
| JF-17 | Low-cost, modern fighter, integrating Chinese avionics, due to India's Su-30MKI procurements. |
Developing many technologies from scratch for Tejas will benefit future Indian projects.
There are differing opinions on how fighter jet performance should be judged, especially without real combat experience.
Judging an aircraft's capabilities before active conflict performance is seen as premature.
It is possible to judge an aircraft's capabilities before discussing its combat performance.
Real combat can shatter an aircraft's abilities judged on paper, as demonstrated by other jets.
A Rafale was shot down by a J-10, despite expectations of Rafale dominance.
F-15s, considered unstoppable, have been shot down multiple times.
Only 3 F-15s were shot down by Kuwaiti air defenses in the current conflict.
The F-15 has not been defeated in aerial combat, with air defense shootdowns not counting negatively.
The Rafale shootdown was attributed to superior Pakistani AWACS usage and datalink efficiency.
One never knows how well a jet will perform unless it has faced real combat.
The F-22 is a fifth-generation air superiority fighter, while Tejas is more comparable to F-4 or F-5 for the IAF.
The F-22 is the best fighter jet for air superiority missions.
A humorous suggestion to order more 112 Rafales is made.